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Tenancy has been a means for labor to advance their socio-economic condition in agriculture yet in
Brazil and Latin America, tenancy rates are low compared to the U.S. and the OECD countries. We
test for the importance of insecure property rights in Brazil on the reluctance of landowners to rent
because of a fear of expropriation arising from land reform. Since 1964, the Land Statute in Brazil
has targeted rental lands for redistribution. The expropriation of farms, resulting from land conflicts,
is currently at the heart of land reform policies in Brazil. Land conflicts are a means for landless peasants
to bring attention to land reform agencies for the need for redistribution. Land conflicts may also signal
to landowners that their land is at risk for expropriation. Utilizing data across all counties in Brazil,
we found that land conflicts reduce the likelihood of tenancy. This result implies: a reduction in agricultural
efficiency; a reduction in the well-being of potential tenants, now landless peasants; and an expansion
of the agricultural frontier through deforestation. Because of endogeneity between land tenancy and
land conflict we instrument land conflict with Catholic priests.
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Variable  N  Mean  Stand. Dev.  Min  Max 
Conflicts per 1000 farms  3640  0.7885  5.921  0  283.582 
Priests per rural population 1985   3631  16.66  42.232  0.072  831.683 
Frontier  3659  1.505  2.262  1  53 
Political opposition 1982 (% seats – MDB)  3659  0.340  0.243  0  1 
Political opposition 1996 (% seats – PT)  3652  0.025  0.057  0  0.615 
Population density 1995   3640  240.62  13,572.77  0.0087  818,792.3 
GDP growth 1985‐1995 (log)  3639  ‐0.165  0.677  ‐4.806  4.062 
Tractors per hectare1995  3588  0.004  0.007  0  0.129 
Average size of farms (hec.)  3640  93.720  174.619  0.104  4296.837 
Cattle per hectare1995  3640  0.556  1.227  0  63.462 
Latitude  3659  ‐16.491  7.644  ‐33.519  3.843 
Longitude  3659  44.881  5.833  32.411  72.67 
Rural/Urban Population (1995)  3621  1.071  1.631  0.0004  63.661 
Population growth 1985‐1995  3659  0.111  0.209 ‐ 0.400  3.490 
Natural Forest (% total farm area) 1995  3640  0.154  0.136  0  0.900 
Natural Pasture (% total farm area) 1995   3640  0.250  0.184  0  0.911 
Permanent crops (% total farm area) 1995  3640  0.053  0.093  0  1 
Usable but not used (% total farm area) 1995  3640  0.048  0.069  0  0.601 
Unsuable area (% total farm area) 1995  3640  0.048  0.034  0  0.846 
% of land in Fixed Rent contracts, 1995  3640  0.049  0.073  0  0.781 
% of land in Sharecropping contracts, 1995  3640  0.021  0.041  0  0.714 
% of land farmed by owner, 1995  3640  0.892  0.104  0  1.00 
% of land occupied, 1995  3640  0.038  0.063  0  1.00 
Cotton, % 1995  3640  0.003  0.012  0  0.315 
Rice, % 1995  3640  0.008  0.026  0  0.709 
Coffee, % 1995  3640  0.012  0.038  0  0.429 
Cane, % 1995  3640  0.039 0.142 0  1.00
Beans, % 1995  3640  0.024 0.047 0  0.715
Manioc, % 1995  3640  0.009 0.027 0  0.580
Corn, % 1995  3640  0.048 0.067 0  0.851
Soya, % 1995  3640  0.021 0.136 0  0.901
Distance to state capital (km)  3659  240.467  158.039  0  1365.742 
Transport cost to São Paulo (index)  3658 1475.81 1114.83 10  10,511.92

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of observations  Total: 3556  Total: 3556 Total: 3556 Total: 3556 
State dummies (27 states)  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R
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Number of observations  Total: 3556   Total: 3556   Total: 3556  Total: 3556 
State dummies (27 states)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.392  0.388  0.395  0.388 
R















































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of observations  Total: 3564 Total: 3564 Total: 3564 Total: 3564 
State dummies (27 states)  Yes Yes Yes Yes
R
2  0.45 0.28 0.43 0.39

2(16)  
Prob>
2 
2946.56
0.0000 
1382.49
0.0000 
2620.91
0.0000 
2256.15
0.0000 
Estimated Seemingly Unrelated Regresion. t‐stats in parentheses. Statistical signif.: 1% 
***. 5% 
**, 10% 
*. The coefficients for all four 
equations are constrained to add up to 0 for every variable. 